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Abstract
This paper attempts to distinguish the effects of household and enterprise credit on economic
growth. To do so, I create a new, hand-collected database covering 143 countries over the period
1995-2014 (126 countries are employed for econometric analysis). Estimation results confirm
recent evidence documenting the absence of the effect of total credit to growth. Findings also
show that household credit has a negative effect on growth, but I fail to provide robust support
for a positive effect of business credit.
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1 Introduction
A common belief found in the literature is that greater financial depth facilitates faster
growth. A large number of papers using different methodologies and data have provided
support for this view (for a review, see Ang, 2008). However, in the wake of the recent
financial crisis, doubts have been raised about this notion and recent studies have con-
firmed these doubts. For instance, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) point out that empirical
studies are fragile and ambiguous. They document that the link between finance and
growth has weakened considerably over time and they show that the positive relationship
between the two has been vanishing since the 1990s.1 Using a meta-analysis approach,
Valickova et al. (2015) confirm the ”vanishing effect”of credit on growth in studies focused
on recent years.
Several theories have been put forward to justify the vanishing effect. One explanation
is based on the idea that too much finance reduces growth. Some authors argue that
beyond a certain threshold, financial depth no longer has a positive effect on growth
(Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015). Other explanations have also been advanced
to explain the vanishing effect, even for countries with moderate financial development
levels. Financial development may only affect convergence towards equilibrium and may
not have any effect on steady-state growth (Aghion et al., 2005). Others argue that
financial liberalization has made financial deepening less effective. Yet another hypothesis
is based on the idea that equity market growth has substituted for the role of banks.
However, existing empirical papers fail to provide clear support for any of these views
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011).
This work explores a different explanation based on the distinction between household
and enterprise credit.2 The recent increase in financial depth has been driven by the
expansion of credit to households. Using a new database (see below), I document that
1They document that coefficients associated with financial depth are not positive for recent years
(1990-2004) as expected. In some regressions, coefficients are even negative and statically significant.
Other studies provide similar results indicating that financial depth does not spur growth (Arcand et al.,
2015; Bezemer et al., 2016).
2In this paper, I employ enterprise credit, firm credit and business credit synonymously.
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the ratio of household credit to total credit has increased over the past decade from 30
% in 2000 to 42 % in 2014 in a context of expansion of total credit. Interestingly, this
evolution is not specific to developed economies but also applies to developing countries.
The expansion of household credit could explain the absence of effect of credit to
growth. Arguments in favor on financing to stimulate growth implicitly concentrate on
firm credit, while theory provides ambiguous predictions about the effect of household
credit on economic growth. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) underline the negative effect of
household credit for the savings rate, and therefore for long-term growth. In addition,
expansion of household credit raises the debt-burden in the present without delivering
higher flows in the future if credit is not used for developing income-generating activities.
Household overindebtness is detrimental for growth (Cecchetti et al., 2011) and increases
the likelihood of a banking crisis (Bu¨yu¨kkarabacak and Valev, 2010). By contrast, some
authors argue that household credit can be positive for growth by facilitating human
capital investment and accumulation (Galor and Zeira, 1993). In addition, household
credit may help to smooth consumption and may limit macroeconomic volatility.
Beck et al. (2012) were the first of the few studies to disentangle the impact of en-
terprise credit and household credit to growth. To do so, they hand-collect data for 45
countries over the period 1994-2005. Using cross-sectional regressions, they find evidence
that enterprise credit raises economic growth whereas household credit has a limited
effect on economic growth. Sassi and Gasmi (2014) use a panel of 27 European coun-
tries over the period 1995-2012. They confirm the positive effect of enterprise credit to
growth but also document that household credit has a negative effect. Bezemer et al.
(2016) also employ a panel analysis based on 46 countries over the period 1990-2011 but
they challenge previous findings. They distinguish between credit for financial activities
(mortgage loans and credit to financial institutions) and non-financial activities (credit
to non-financial corporations and consumer loans). Contrary to a large consensus in the
literature, they find a negative effect of credit to growth on average that is explained by
the stock of credit for financial purposes. However, they fail to prove that the stock of
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credit to non-financial activities spurs growth. Such conflicting results in the literature
can be explained by the samples considered (and varying methodologies).3
This paper has two aims. First, I provide a new database on credit structure (Credit
Structure Database) covering a large range of countries. To do so, I hand-collected
data on household credit and enterprise credit for 143 countries over the period 1995-
2014. Using this new data, I provide some interesting facts about the structure of credit
around the world and its evolution over time. First, I document that not only the level
but also the structure of credit is related to the level of development. Simple data
description highlights that the share of household credit is positively correlated with
the level of economic development (and financial) development. Second, data show that
the composition of bank credit has substantially changed in recent years to reflect an
increase of the share of household credit. This increase is particularly strong in developing
countries.
I then employ this new database to assess the differential impact of household and
business credit on growth. I replicate methodology employed in most recent studies using
both cross-country and panel regressions (Arcand et al., 2015; Bezemer et al., 2016). Due
to the limited data on control variables, regressions are estimated on a sub-sample of
126 countries. In a first step, I assess the effect of total credit on growth, confirming the
”vanishing effect” reported in recent works (Valickova et al., 2015). Econometric results
show that total credit has no statistical impact on growth. Next, I disentangle the impact
of household credit and business credit. The results prove interesting. First, household
credit has a detrimental effect on growth, in line with previous studies (Sassi and Gasmi,
2014; Bezemer et al., 2016). However, I do not confirm the positive effect of enterprise
credit. The sign of the coefficient associated with enterprise credit is often positive but
rarely statistically significant. These findings are robust to various specifications and are
not specific to either developed or developing countries.
3These papers focus on a small, limited number of countries mainly from the developed world. One
exception is Beck et al. (2012) who also consider developing countries but only report cross-sectional
results due to the lack of time-variation.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and provides some basic pictures on the structure of credit around the world and its
evolution over time. Section 3 presents the methodology and Section 4 displays descriptive
statistics. Section 5 discusses the economic impact of total credit. Section 6 presents
results on the differential impact of enterprise credit and household credit. The final
section concludes.
2 Credit structure around the world
2.1 Credit Structure Database
Data were hand-collected from Central Bank publications including Central Bank annual
reports, supervision department/agency annual reports, annual bulletins and statistical
digests. The most difficult task consisted in harmonizing data from diverse sources with
their own classifications. Some basic filters were applied to allow comparison across
countries. From the supply-side, I focused on credit provided by commercial banks. Put
differently, I did not consider credit provided by non-banking financial institutions as
data on loans provided by non-banking financial intermediaries are not always available.
In some countries, total credit provided by the financial sector can be very different from
credit provided by the banking system (e.g., in the US). However, in the majority of
countries, loans are mainly provided by commercial banks. A second filter concerns the
demand-side. I excluded credit allocated to central and local administration because I
focus my attention on private credit. In addition, we also excluded credit to financial
companies. Based on these filters, I considered all countries for which I was able to
identify a consistent data source. Household credit was defined as credit to household,
credit to individuals or a similar item. Enterprise credit was defined as credit allocated
to non-financial corporations.
I faced two major issues. The first was whether to include credit to state-owned en-
terprises. This issue concerns only a handful of countries (such as those with transition
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economies) but can be important for them. To avoid (spurious) breaks due to privatiza-
tion of former state-owned companies in recent years, I considered credit to state-owned
enterprises as part of business (private) credit. The second issue was the difficulty to
distinguish between household and firm credit for sole proprietorship. For the majority
of countries, I had no information on individual enterprises. However, when I was able
to obtain sufficient disaggregated data, loans to individual companies were considered
as an element of firm credit. Based on this data, I computed total credit as the sum
of enterprise credit and household credit. Finally, we divided the amount of (enterprise,
household and total) credit to current GDP to get the usual ratio of credit to GDP.
The Credit Structure Database (CDS) differs from existing datasets in two aspects.
Firstly, it considers 143 countries spanning different periods, depending on data availabil-
ity, from 1995 to 2014. Other databases covered less than 50 countries.4 Considering a
large range of countries allows to include economies from all levels of development and
from all continents. Twenty countries were classified as low-income countries in 2015,
67 as middle-income countries and 56 as high-income countries. The sample includes 42
countries from Europe, 29 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 2 from North Amer-
ica, 4 from Central Asia, 20 from East Asia and the Pacific, 6 from South Asia, 30 from
Sub-Saharan Africa and 12 from the Middle-East and North Africa. The list of countries
and the period considered, by country, as well as classification of each country (region
and income group) are reported in the Appendix (Table A1). In addition, panel data
structure allows to study evolution of credit structure over time and provide more robust
econometric estimations. Obviously, I could not get data for all years in all countries.
However, for a large number of countries, I was able to provide a sufficient time span to
study evolution of credit structure (see Table A1, column Sample - Evolution).
Secondly, obtaining reliable information on household credit is difficult, especially in
less developed countries. A solution is to define credit to household has a residual. For
445 countries for Beck et al. (2012)’s database, 27 European countries for Sassi and Gasmi (2014)’s
database and 46 countries for Bezemer et al. (2016)’s database
6
instance, Beck et al. (2012), who collect data only on business credit, compute credit to
household as the difference between overall credit (extracted from the Financial Struc-
ture Database) and enterprise credit. I did not adopt the same methodology. Rather, I
reported credit to household when explicit data was reported, therefore improving relia-
bility of data.5
Before investigating the database in detail, I scrutinize whether the Credit Structure
Database (CDS) provides reliable data. To do so, I compare the ratio of total credit to
GDP computed as the sum of business and household credit with the ratio of private
credit to GDP extracted from the Financial Structure Database (Beck et al., 2010).
Correlation coefficients range from 87 % (one observation per country: 143 countries) to
90% (country-year observations: 1,947 observations). When I regress total credit obtained
from the CDS to the private credit provided by the Financial Structure Database, the
estimated coefficient is highly significant and its magnitude is around one. In other
words, the CDS provides a close picture than that depicted in the usually used Financial
Structure Database.
2.2 Data exploration
2.2.1 Comparison across country
I first present some basic statistics about credit structure around the world.6 Total credit
represents on average 51% of GDP, household credit 21% of GDP and enterprise credit
30%. The ratio of household credit to total credit accounts for one third of total credit
on average (see Table 1).
However, there is large variation across countries. Both the level of credit to GDP
and the composition of credit differ greatly. Guinea-Bissau had the lowest overall level
5It should be noted that we were able to collect data on business credit for 18 additional countries
(Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Iran, Jordan, Laos,
Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Samoa, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Taiwan and Yemen) but I did not include
them in this study because I was unable to retrieve data on household credit for these countries.
6When not explicitly specified, we consider all 143 countries included in the CSD.
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Table 1: Credit Structure Database - Summary statistics
Variables Obs.† Mean SD. Min 25th Median 25th Max
Credit to GDP
Total credit 1,947 (143) 51.92 40.95 0.49 20.39 41.28 74.48 309.82
Enterprise credit 1,947 (143) 30.24 24.03 0.32 13.92 24.03 40.38 171.02
Household credit 1,961 (143) 21.64 21.80 0.00 4.60 14.54 32.56 141.80
Ratio
Household credit/Total credit 1,947 (143) 35.20 18.00 0.00 22.06 36.95 48.96 87.02
† the number of countries is reported in parentheses
of credit over the sample period with a credit to GDP ratio of 2.3% while Cyprus has
the highest overall level of credit with over 250%. The interquartile ratio (Q3/Q1) was
3.5 with one quarter of countries having a ratio below 20% and one quarter having a
ratio above 75%. Table 2 shows that the level of private credit is related to the level of
development. The ratio of total credit to GDP was 77% for high-income countries but
less than 15% for low-income countries.
Table 2: Credit structure, by group of countries
Credit to GDP HC/TC† # Obs.
TC† EC† HC† (in %)
All countries 51.92 30.24 21.64 35.20 1,947
By income
High income 77.4 41.4 35.8 45.3 854
Upper middle-income 43.6 26.7 16.9 36.8 483
Lower middle-income 27.8 20.1 7.8 24.6 380
Low-income 14.6 13.0 1.7 11.7 230
By level of financial development§
1st quartile 12.12 9.53 2.59 20.30 478
2nd quartile 29.40 20.18 9.22 31.07 462
3rd quartile 56.04 31.65 24.39 43.11 500
4th quartile 109.81 59.43 49.41 45.77 478
† TC: Total credit; EC: Enterprise credit; HC: Household credit
§ 1st quartile: TC<20%; 2nd quartile: 20%<TC<40%; 3rd quartile:
41%<TC<75%; 4th quartile: TC>75%
The composition of credit presents similar heterogeneity. Household credit represents
more than four fifths of credit in Canada, while household credit is almost non-existent in
some African countries (Be´nin, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea). Table 2 shows that the
share of household credit is related to the level of economic and financial development.
For instance, in high-income countries the ratio of household credit represents almost 50%
of total credit but only 11% in low-income countries. In Table 2, I also divide the sample
according to the level of total credit. I observe that the ratio of household credit is related
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to the level of financial development. This ratio ranges from 20% for the least financial
developed countries to 45 % for the fourth quartile countries. This feature is interesting:
as a country develops a larger share of credit is oriented towards the household.
2.2.2 Evolution over time
Figure 1: Evolution of credit
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Note: Figures are based on a sub-sample of 85 countries
Until now, I have focused our analysis on differences across countries. I now turn to
evolution of credit composition. To provide a comparable analysis, we consider a sub-
sample of 85 countries for which we could obtain information from 2002 to 2014 (see Table
A1, column sample - evolution). This sub-sample includes 7 low-income countries, 40
middle-income (including 18 lower middle income and 22 upper-middle income) countries
and 38 high income countries. Figure 1 displays the evolution of total credit, household
credit and enterprise credit over the period 2000-2014 for these countries. I observe a
sharp increase of total credit from 2004 to 2009. The average ratio of total credit to GDP
increased by 17 points in five years (from 45% in 2005 to 62% in 2009). This increase
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was driven both by expansion of enterprise credit (+ 9 points from 26% to 35%) and
expansion of household credit (+ 8 points from 19% to 27%). Figure 2 scrutinizes in
detail the growth of household and enterprise credit in recent years, especially during
the credit boom preceding the 2008 global financial crisis. The dashed line indicates the
average annual rates of growth of business credit and the dotted line those for household
credit, by year. The solid line shows the average ratio of household credit to total credit.
I observe that the growth of household credit preceded the expansion of enterprise credit
and reached a higher peak than enterprise credit peak. The growth of business credit
outpaced that of household credit only from 2006 to 2009. As a result, the ratio of
household credit to total credit increased over time. After the beginning of the financial
crisis, household credit continued to expand, while we observe a decline of enterprise
credit.
Figure 2: Growth of household credit and enterprise credit
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Note: Figures are based on a sub-sample of 85 countries
A related question is whether these trends were driven by developed countries. To
treat this question, I divide the sample of 85 countries into two groups: 38 developed
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(high-income) countries and 47 developing (low-income and middle-income) countries.
Figure 3 plots the ratio of total credit to GDP for both groups as well as the ratio of
household credit to total credit (this gives us a picture of whether household credit growth
exceeds business credit growth). Two main observations can be made. Firstly, total credit
increased in both groups of countries. The ratio of total credit to GDP increased by 12
points in developing countries from 2005 to 2009 (from 27% to 39%) and by 22 points
in developed economies (from 69% in 2005 to 91% in 2009). Secondly, household credit
is an important driver of growth not only in developed countries but also in developing
countries. Indeed, the growth of credit was driven by household credit from 2001 to 2006
and after 2009 in both developed and developing countries. The ratio of household credit
to total credit increased from 20% to 31% (+11 points) in developing countries and from
40% to 47% (+7 points) in developed countries between 2001 and 2006. After 2006, we
observe a stagnation of this ratio until 2012 in developing countries. However, after a
reduction in 2007 and 2008, the share of household credit continued to grow in developed
countries to over 50% in 2014.
3 Methodology
The main objective of this paper is to assess the contribution of credit structure to growth.
I merely replicate the usual methodology employed in the finance-growth literature (Beck
and Levine, 2004; Arcand et al., 2015). To empirically investigate the effect of credit to
growth, a Barro-style growth regression is used. I begin by considering the overall credit
to GDP. This first model is used to confirm (or not) the absence of effect of total credit
(vanishing effect). Formally, the estimated model is as follows:
Yit = α + βTCit + ΓXit + uit (1)
where i and t refer to country and period, respectively. Yit is the average growth rate of
real GDP per capita, TCit is the initial level of total credit to GDP (defined as the sum
11
Figure 3: Growth of credit, developed and developing countries
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of household and business credit) and Xit is a set of explanatory variables. According to
the standard finance-growth literature, β should be positive indicating that finance spurs
growth. However, recent studies document that finance has not spurred growth in recent
years and we could observe that β = 0 (confirming the vanishing effect). Finally, β < 0
implies that the stock of overall credit has been negative for growth in recent years.
In a second step, I remove total credit and include household credit to GDP and
business credit to GDP.7 The empirical model becomes:
Yit = α + β1HCit + β2ECit + ΓXit + uit (2)
where HCit is the initial level of household credit to GDP and ECit the enterprise credit
over GDP. Existing literature on credit structure (Beck et al., 2012; Sassi and Gasmi,
2014) points out that business credit is beneficial for growth, while household credit is
7I also include household credit and enterprise credit independently. Results are not reported but are
close to those that considering household and enterprise credit simultaneously.
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not. I therefore expect that β2 > 0 and β1 = 0 (or β1 < 0). However, according to
Bezemer et al. (2016)’s findings, both β1 and β2 could be negative.
To select the list of control variables, I follow the finance-growth literature. Control
variables (Xit) include the initial level of GDP per capita, the inflation rate (computed
from the consumer price index), the level of education assessed by the secondary school
enrollment rate, trade openness (i.e. imports plus exports to GDP) and government
final consumption expenditure to GDP. All of these variables are extracted from the
World Development Indicators. To reduce any simultaneity bias, initial values rather
than average values for all explanatory variables are employed. All control variables are
in logs. I consider both the level and log of the credit variables (TCit, HCit, and ECit).
The definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix (Table A2).
Following the finance-growth literature (King and Levine, 1993; Beck and Levine,
2004; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2015), I begin the analysis with a
simple cross-country regression. In spite of its limitations, a cross-sectional analysis is
a transparent way to describe the data. In a second step, I exploit the time dimension
by using a panel model. It is usual in the literature to employ non-overlapping five-year
periods to control for business cycles. Given the short time span, we follow Bezemer
et al. (2016) and use 3-year periods. All panel estimates include period fixed effects. I
start with a baseline fixed-effect (FE) model. The presence of initial GDP per capita,
however, puts the model inside the context of a dynamic panel model and FE model is no
longer valid. As is now standard in growth literature with limited time-periods, I employ
the GMM-system estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). All explanatory
variables are considered as weakly exogenous and available lagged values are used as
internal instruments.8 To improve identification, I add external instruments, namely
legal origin and religious composition. These external instruments are frequently used
(Beck et al., 2012; Sassi and Gasmi, 2014). I use the two-step procedure proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) and obtain robust standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005)
8Considering all explanatory variables as endogenous and therefore using two lags and more as in-
struments provides close results.
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finite sample correction.
Regressions are run on a sample of 126 countries over the period 1995-2014. Indeed,
I cannot use all 143 countries for which I collected data on credit due to the lack of data
regarding control variables. The list of countries considered for estimations is presented
in Table A1 (column sample - regression).
4 Descriptive statistics
Before implementing econometric regressions, I scrutinize the data in detail. Tables 3
and 4 report descriptive statistics and correlations for annual (panel A), 3-year (panel
B) and cross-country observations (panel C), respectively. The most striking feature is
the negative correlation between (total, household and enterprise) credit and economic
growth. These figures are in line with the findings from Bezemer et al. (2016) but also
contradict a large body of the literature documenting a positive relationship between
finance and growth (Ang, 2008).9
To investigate whether the relationship between credit and growth has changed over
time, I plot correlation coefficients between credit and growth by year in the Appendix.
To get comparable data, I keep only countries for which I have data from 2000 to 2014 (the
sub-sample of 85 countries employed in Section 2). Figure A1 displays annual correlations
between growth and total credit (using data from the Credit Structure Database and from
the Financial Structure Database). I observe that results are not specific to the database
considered and that growth and credit to GDP have been negatively correlated since 2001
(i.e., before the 2008 global financial crisis). I also plot correlation coefficients between
growth and household credit and between growth and firm credit by year. Figure A1
shows that even if absolute coefficients are higher for household credit, enterprise credit
9To be sure that this negative correlation is not driven by misleading data, I run correlation between
private credit to GDP extracted from the Financial Structure Database (FSD) and growth. As stated
above, correlation between total credit to GDP from our data and private credit to GDP from FSD
is around 0.9. I also confirm the negative correlation with a coefficient ranging from -0.22 (annual
observations) to -0.26 (3-year period observations).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Annual observations
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 1,732 2.324762 3.989473 -15.2841 33.03049
TC 1,732 53.59536 41.67179 0.49 309.82
HC 1,732 22.72153 22.41668 0 141.8
EC 1,732 30.87376 22.74632 0.32 171.02
IGDP 1,732 13119.35 15896.93 205.4306 87772.69
GOV 1,732 16.54879 6.890008 3.460335 104.8991
TRADE 1,732 90.5557 49.41419 16.7497 455.2767
INF 1,732 5.605183 11.72403 -18.1086 293.6787
EDUC 1,340 86.30569 27.6468 6.75819 163.101
Panel B: 3-year period observations
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 631 2.336648 3.250973 -11.828 25.11444
TC 631 51.2545 41.00806 0.56 309.82
HC 631 21.29176 21.83201 0 138.8
EC 631 29.96292 22.56078 0.34 171.02
IGDP 631 12632.85 15606.9 205.4306 85490.77
GOV 631 16.52886 6.902227 3.460335 103.5452
TRADE 631 88.45555 47.39703 16.7497 449.9926
INF 631 6.177558 16.63824 -4.47994 293.6787
EDUC 545 84.91988 28.2035 6.89066 158.797
Panel C: Cross-country observations
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 126 2.272255 2.269427 -5.64269 8.967809
TC 126 41.43151 34.60325 1.74 170.3
HC 126 15.50492 17.17625 0.14 87.94
EC 126 25.92651 20.18003 1.41 103.5
IGDP 126 10165.45 13202.28 223.8812 64021.39
GOV 126 16.19367 7.739287 4.483654 81.64147
TRADE 126 84.71338 41.79441 16.7497 262.0212
INF 126 5.196951 5.173127 0.091761 35.26612
EDUC 105 77.32187 32.06592 6.898655 145.1931
is not positively correlated with growth.
Figure A2 in the Appendix focuses on the distinction between developed and devel-
oping countries. I only report coefficients between total credit to GDP and growth. The
red line presents coefficients for developed countries and the blue line those for developed
countries. With the exception of 2009 and 2013-2014, credit seems less detrimental to
growth in developing countries. Since the global financial crisis, growth and credit have
not been correlated in developing countries. However, in developed countries, even before
2008, correlation between credit and growth was negative, albeit highly unstable. In the
next section, I run an econometric model to provide more robust evidence on the impact
of (total, household and enterprise) credit on growth of real GDP per capita.
15
Table 4: Correlations
Panel A: Annual observations
GROWTH TC HC EC IGDP GOV TRADE INF EDUC
GROWTH 1
TC -0.2101 1
HC -0.2015 0.9215 1
EC -0.1864 0.9239 0.7027 1
IGDP -0.1691 0.6263 0.6694 0.4877 1
GOV -0.0666 0.1502 0.1663 0.1112 0.2092 1
TRADE 0.0748 0.2513 0.2397 0.2242 0.2593 0.0419 1
INF 0.0718 -0.2164 -0.2148 -0.1848 -0.1792 -0.0485 -0.0498 1
EDUC -0.0479 0.5017 0.5464 0.3864 0.5669 0.2372 0.1454 -0.1364 1
Panel B: 3-year period observations
GROWTH TC HC EC IGDP GOV TRADE INF EDUC
GROWTH 1
TC -0.2522 1
HC -0.2429 0.9211 1
EC -0.2233 0.9263 0.7066 1
IGDP -0.2052 0.6285 0.6731 0.4911 1
GOV -0.07 0.1496 0.1653 0.1121 0.2081 1
TRADE 0.0817 0.2349 0.2366 0.1981 0.25 0.0492 1
INF 0.052 -0.1934 -0.1905 -0.1671 -0.1498 -0.0356 -0.0298 1
EDUC -0.0407 0.5094 0.5487 0.3944 0.5727 0.2528 0.1594 -0.1298 1
Panel C: Cross-country observations
GROWTH TC HC EC IGDP GOV TRADE INF EDUC
GROWTH 1
TC -0.2453 1
HC -0.2656 0.9129 1
EC -0.1945 0.9377 0.7143 1
IGDP -0.3812 0.5742 0.6347 0.4444 1
GOV 0.0831 0.0375 0.0687 0.0058 0.1295 1
TRADE 0.0672 0.2227 0.2615 0.1593 0.1653 0.0815 1
INF 0.3325 -0.3784 -0.3887 -0.3179 -0.3546 -0.0523 -0.1138 1
EDUC -0.0092 0.4644 0.514 0.3579 0.617 0.3636 0.1842 -0.1833 1
5 Total credit and growth
5.1 Baseline model
I first scrutinize the effect of total credit to growth. Results of cross-country regressions
are reported in Table 5. I consider both the log and level of total credit over GDP.
For both measures, the first column displays OLS results without the education variable
(school enrollment). In the subsequent columns, I add the education variable. Despite a
reduction of the number of observations (initial level of secondary enrollment is available
only for a subset of 105 countries), the model with education is the preferred model
(because it allows me to control for human capital). Finally, in spite of the use of the
initial value of total credit, one might raise concerns about endogeneity. I therefore
employ an IV approach using the same instruments as those employed by Beck et al.
(2012): legal origin and religious composition.
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Table 5: Total credit and growth, cross-country regressions
Log of total credit Level of total credit
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
TC 0.0530 -0.1484 -0.8896* 0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0061
(0.19) (-0.49) (-1.90) (0.18) (-0.36) (-0.55)
IGDP -0.2387 -1.0925*** -0.8465*** -0.2332 -1.1156*** -1.0779***
(-1.43) (-4.81) (-3.09) (-1.44) (-4.60) (-4.18)
GOV 0.3946 0.3904 0.3639 0.5087 0.3820 0.3830
(0.67) (0.54) (0.49) (0.67) (0.52) (0.51)
TRADE 0.5059 -0.0296 0.0457 0.5087 -0.0406 -0.0395
(1.21) (-0.08) (0.12) (1.24) (-0.11) (-0.11)
INF 1.0196*** 0.4231 0.2813 1.0221*** 0.4301 0.3941
(3.65) (1.45) (0.84) (3.64) (1.48) (1.24)
EDUC 2.3449*** 2.4195*** 2.3353*** 2.3445***
(3.83) (3.86) (3.88) (3.99)
Constant -0.5486 0.4704 0.5376 -0.4949 0.3623 0.2057
(-0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (-0.16) (0.12) (0.07)
R2 0.21 0.40 0.35 0.21 0.40 0.40
Obs 126 105 102 126 105 102
F-value 6.61 6.818
OID 9.62 15.997
(p-value) (0.128) (0.014)
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. For independent variables,
initial values are used. All control variables are in log. The logarithm of total credit to
GDP is used in columns [1] to [3] and the level of total credit to GDP in columns [4] to [6].
Instruments are the legal origin and religious composition in columns [3] and [6]. F-value is
the F-statistic of the first stage equation for excluded instruments. OID is the Hansen over-
identification test. P-values are calculated form robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The main finding is the lack of statistical significance of the coefficient associated with
total credit. The coefficient associated to total credit is statistically significant in only
one of the six regressions. In the case where the total credit coefficient is statistically
significant (column [3]), its sign is negative while one could expect a positive impact of
credit to growth. These preliminary results tend to confirm the vanishing effect high-
lighted in works using panel estimations on recent data (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011)
or a meta-analysis (Valickova et al., 2015). Regarding control variables, the initial value
of GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant, in line with the convergence
hypothesis. In addition, education is positively correlated with growth.
Cross-sectional regressions help us to improve descriptive statistics but suffer from ma-
jor limitations, in particular the difficulty to control for unobserved country-heterogeneity.
I therefore turn to panel data that allows us to correct for this through the inclusion of
country fixed effects. Table 6 presents the baseline results for panel regressions. Three-
year periods are considered and country and period fixed effects are included. The table is
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divided into two parts according to the measure of total credit considered (logs or levels).
For each part, the first column reports the simple FE estimations without taking into ac-
count the dynamic nature of the panel. In the second column, I report the Blundell and
Bond (1998)’s specification using only internal instruments (lagged values of independent
variables). In the third column, I extend the previous Blundell-Bond specification by
adding external instruments, namely legal origin and religious composition. The usual
diagnostic tests associated to the GMM-system estimator are reported at the bottom of
the table (Arellano tests for autocorrelation and Hansen over-identification test). In ad-
dition, Roodman (2009) underlines that too many instruments might bias the validity of
the Hansen test. I therefore report the number of instruments used in each estimation. A
simple rule of thumb is that the number of instruments should be lower than the number
of cross-sectional observations (i.e., here the number of countries).
Table 6: Total credit and growth, panel regressions
Log of total credit Level of total credit
FE GMM-S. GMM-S. FE GMM-S. GMM-S.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
TC -0.4494 -1.1765 -0.7770 -0.0372*** -0.0273 -0.0097
(-0.80) (-0.93) (-0.80) (3.62) (-0.77) (-0.93)
IGDP -8.9027*** -2.7674*** -1.6985* -8.7397*** -2.8284** -1.7483**
(-4.39) (-3.00) (-1.78) (-5.17) (-2.11) (-2.39)
GOV -2.6135* -0.8426 -4.1638** -2.0565 1.2418 -4.1353**
(-1.80) (-0.28) (-1.98) (-1.50) (0.40) (-2.23)
TRADE 2.5596** 5.5879** -0.3405 2.2545* 5.9633** -0.0055
(2.15) (2.17) (-0.13) (1.90) (2.10) (-0.00)
INF -0.2086 -0.2314 -0.3590* -0.1595 -0.2041 -0.3173*
(-1.47) (-1.03) (-1.68) (-1.16) (-0.93) (-1.68)
EDUC 1.0180 7.2625*** 7.4941*** 0.3766 6.4083** 7.0384***
(1.21) (3.58) (2.60) (0.43) (2.50) (2.61)
Constant 71.5710*** -21.3976* 1.3434 72.5790*** -28.2187* -0.0030
(4.42) (-1.74) (0.20) (5.25) (-1.93) (-0.00)
R2 0.36 0.40
Obs 512 512 497 512 512 497
Country 126 126 122 126 126 122
# Instruments 44 51 44 51
AR(1) -2.75*** -3.05*** -2.49** -3.03***
AR(2) -1.36 -0.07 -1.03 -0.17
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.617 0.318 0.350 0.331
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. All regressions consist of 3-year non-
overlapping growth spells. Models are estimated using fixed-effects (within) estimator (columns [1] and [4]),
Blundell-Bond’s GMM-system estimator with internal instruments only (columns [2] and [5]) and Blundell-
Bond’s GMM-system estimator with internal instruments and external instruments (legal origin and religion)
in columns [3] and [6]. The logarithm of (initial) total credit to GDP is used in columns [1-3] and the level
of (initial) total credit to GDP in columns [4-6]. All control variables are in log and initial values for each
period are used. Period dummies are added but not reported in the table. AR(1/2) are the usual Arellano
tests for autocorrelation and Hansen OID is the Hansen test of over-identification. P-values are calculated
form robust standard errors (clustered robust errors for FE specification and robust errors using Windmeijer
approach for correction in GMM-System regressions). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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Results from simple fixed-effect models provide a mixed picture (columns [1] and [4]).
The model with the level of total credit to GDP shows that finance is detrimental for
growth (column [4]); however, this result is not robust when considering the logarithm of
total credit (column [1]). In other columns, I use a well-fitted dynamic model due to the
inclusion of the initial GDP per capita. The common tests are in line with expectations
(AR(1); AR(2); and the Hansen over-identification test). Coefficients associated with
total credit are negative but insignificant at the usual thresholds in the different spec-
ifications (including or excluding external instruments). Turning to control variables,
findings are close to those provided by cross-sectional regressions. The coefficients asso-
ciated with the initial level of GDP per capita are negative and statistically significant,
even if their effect is largely reduced when we consider the dynamic nature of the panel.
This result indicates the presence of a convergence process. In addition, the initial level
of education is a strong determinant of future growth. Two less robust results emerge:
inflation seems detrimental to growth, while trade openness tends to stimulate growth.
Our results confirm findings from recent studies (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand
et al., 2015; Valickova et al., 2015) indicating that private credit over GDP is no longer
a determinant of economic growth. This result is known as the ”vanishing effect” of
finance to growth and has profound implications for policymakers. Several hypotheses
have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. In Section 6, I focus my attention
on credit structure. Before doing so, I investigate whether our main result is robust,
especially when we consider alternative stories.
5.2 Robustness checks
I run a battery of sensitivity tests to be sure that our baseline findings are robust, adding
control variables and testing alternative specifications. Firstly, I add the institutional level
because the level of credit is higher in countries with better institutions (Chinn and Ito,
2006) and good institutions matter for growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005). The institutional
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level is captured through the quality of government indicator provided by the ICRG.10
Secondly, a large financial system can induce more risks that blur its positive effect on
growth in normal times (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006). The absence of effect of finance
on growth can be explained by its indirect effect on instability. Following Arcand et al.
(2015), I consider two proxies of instability. I first add the number of banking crises as a
control variable (data on banking crises is extracted from Laeven and Valencia (2013)’s
database). I also consider an alternative measure of instability, namely the volatility of
output. Finally, I add the development of the stock market. Stock market development
can spur growth (Beck and Levine, 2004) and may reduce the positive effect of banking
development due to a substitution effect. Results are reported in the Appendix (Table
A3).11 In a nutshell, the baseline finding is not altered: total credit does not spur growth
even after controlling for institutions, instability or stock markets. In 6 out of 8 regressions
coefficients associated with overall credit over GDP are not statistically different from
zero. Coefficients associated with total credit are negative and statically significant when
institutional development is included, indicating that finance limits growth instead of
stimulating it as expected when I control for the institutional level.
I also consider alternative robustness checks focusing on econometric specification.
First, to test the influence of outliers, I trim the top and bottom 5% of annual growth
and the top and bottom 5% of total credit over GDP. Secondly, I employ data from
the Financial Structure Database (Beck et al., 2010) in line with the existing literature.
Finally, I change econometric specification in different ways. I use average values instead
of initial values for control and credit variables as initial values are more likely to avoid
simultaneous bias. However, some papers employ average values (e.g. Beck and Levine,
2004; Beck et al., 2012) and results can be sensitive to this choice. I also change the
time period considered for panel data estimations to 3-year periods in the baseline. As
10 The value is the mean of three sub-indicators (corruption, law and order and business quality) scaled
from zero to one. Higher values indicate higher quality of government.
11To save space, I only report dynamic panel data using the log of total credit as interest variable. I
run all robustness checks using the level of total credit instead of the log of total credit and cross-sectional
regressions. Results are similar and available upon request.
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a robustness check, I consider annual observations as in Sassi and Gasmi (2014) and the
usual five-year periods. Both specifications suffer from limitations. Annual observations
do not allow me to control for business cycle fluctuations and I have a limited number
of five-year periods (a maximum of four per country). I display results for panel data
in Table A4 in the Appendix. Coefficients associated with total credit remain negative,
albeit not significant.
A final concern involves the non-linearity in the relationship between private credit
and growth. Several papers (Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015) demonstrate
that the finance-growth relationship takes the form of an inverted U-shape. The lack of
significance of total credit can be driven by the linear specification employed here. One
should note that this aspect is partially treated when we consider the log of total credit.
However, I run a model using a quadratic form for total credit. Results for panel data are
displayed in the Appendix (Table A5). Neither the coefficient associated with the level,
nor that associated with the square are significantly different from zero. This finding is in
line with Hasan et al. (2016) that fail to find a nonlinear effect of financial development
on growth. I also test whether the relationship between private credit and growth differs
between developing and developed countries. I use two different specifications. I add an
interaction between a dummy for high-income countries and overall credit to GDP. I also
consider two sub-samples: developed countries (defined as high-income countries) and
developing countries (grouping together low- and middle-income countries). Econometric
results reported in the same table fail to show a difference between high-income countries
and developing countries.
6 Household vs. enterprise credit
6.1 Baseline model
Findings provided in the previous section confirm the vanishing effect of finance to growth
observed in recent studies. Several explanations have been proposed (as discussed in
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Section 1). Robustness checks in the previous section have highlighted that some expla-
nations such as the substitution effect between banks and equity markets or an increase
of financial fragility are not sufficient to explain the lack of effect of credit to growth. In
this work, I focus on the structure of credit (distinction between household credit and
enterprise credit). Exploration of our data documents that credit expansion in the past
decade has been driven by an increase of household credit (see Section 2), a stylized fact
also shown by Bezemer et al. (2016). Recent studies, especially Beck et al. (2012) and
Sassi and Gasmi (2014), have pointed out that household credit is less subject to spur
growth than firm credit. However, these findings are subject to caution due to the limited
size of the samples considered. Using a new database covering a large range of countries,
I revisit this issue. To do so, I remove total credit in the baseline model and include both
household credit and enterprise credit (see Eq. 2).12
Table 7 displays the results from the cross-country regressions. I use the same spec-
ification presented in the previous section (distinction between credit in levels and logs;
OLS without education, OLS with education, IV). With one exception, neither house-
hold credit nor enterprise credit is statistically significant at the usual thresholds. The
exception is the IV model that considers variables in logarithm. In column [3], household
credit is negative and statistically significant. However, the coefficient associated with
enterprise credit is not statistically significant.
I now turn to the data panel to provide a few robustness checks. Results of the
baseline model are displayed in Table 8. The simple FE estimations give opposing pre-
dictions about the effect of household credit. While the coefficient associated with the
log of household credit is positive (column [1]), the coefficient associated with the level of
household credit is negative (column [4]). I also report results using Blundell and Bond
(1998)’s system GMM estimators without (columns [2] and [5]) and with external instru-
ments (columns [3] and [6]). I focus my discussion on the (more robust) specification
considering both internal and external instruments. Results show that household credit
12In all regressions (baseline and robustness checks), I include household credit and enterprise credit.
I run all models including household credit and enterprise credit separately. Results are largely similar.
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Table 7: Household and enterprise credit and growth, cross-country regressions
Log of household and enterprise credit Level of household and enterprise credit
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
HC 0.2813 0.1130 -1.0247** -0.0126 -0.0012 -0.0585
(1.28) (0.53) (-2.02) (-0.76) (-0.08) (-1.38)
EC -0.1885 -0.2325 0.5880 0.0102 -0.0030 0.0258
(-0.56) (-0.71) (0.67) (0.98) (-0.33) (0.83)
IGDP -0.3681* -1.1520*** -0.6768** -0.1958 -1.1207*** -0.8152**
(-1.81) (-4.82) (2.12) (-1.07) (-4.18) (-2.37)
GOV 0.2946 0.3566 0.6759 0.4019 0.3839 0.2401
(0.49) (0.49) (0.88) (0.67) (0.52) (0.32)
TRADE 0.4064 -0.0784 0.1761 0.5642 -0.0464 0.2311
(0.95) (-0.20) (0.42) (1.40) (-0.13) (0.46)
INF 1.0331*** 0.4435 0.3532 1.0165*** 0.4292 0.4192
(3.68) (1.52) (1.08) (3.76) (1.46) (1.31)
EDUC 2.2854*** 2.8088*** 2.3391*** 2.1548***
(3.64) (3.83) (3.84) (3.54)
Constant 1.4097 1.4654 -6.8005 -1.0612 0.4103 -1.9746
(0.38) (0.38) (-1.20) (-0.35) (0.13) (-0.50)
R2 0.22 0.40 0.24 0.22 0.40 0.32
Obs 126 105 102 126 105 102
F-value 3.965 2.927
OID 8.75 11.453
(p-value) (0.119) -0.0413
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. For independent variables,
initial values are used. All control variables are in log. The logarithm of household and business
credit to GDP is used in columns [1] to [3] and the level of household and business credit to GDP
in columns [4] to [6]. Instruments are the legal origin and religious composition in columns [3]
and [6]. F-value is the F-statistic of the first stage equation for excluded instruments. OID is
the Hansen over-identification test. P-values are calculated form robust standard errors. *, **,
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
is detrimental for growth, while enterprise credit tends to have no impact on growth. Co-
efficients associated with household credit are negative and statistically significant at the
5% level. The economic impact is far from anecdotal: a one standard deviation increase of
household credit decreases growth by more than 1.5 points. The effect of enterprise credit
is less clear-cut: coefficients associated with firm credit are positive but not statistically
different from zero at the usual thresholds.
The baseline results provide two main findings. First, household credit is detrimental
for growth. This finding is in line with those from Sassi and Gasmi (2014) and Bezemer
et al. (2016) on different samples (European and OECD countries, respectively) but does
not support results from Beck et al. (2012) that document a positive, albeit moderate,
impact of household credit. Second, while I could expect a positive effect of business
credit, the data analysis does not give support for this view. Coefficients associated with
firm credit are never statistically significant, in line with Bezemer et al. (2016)’s results.
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Table 8: Household and enterprise credit and growth, panel regressions
Log of household and enterprise credit Level of household and enterprise credit
FE GMM-S. GMM-S. FE GMM-S. GMM-S.
[1] [2] [1] [4] [5] [6]
LHC 0.7982* -0.0899 -1.3426** -0.0690*** 0.0268 -0.0751**
(1.91) (-0.07) (2.12) (-2.93) (0.56) (-2.47)
LEC -1.0681** -0.8152 0.9426 -0.0185 -0.0603 0.0372
(-1.98) (-0.66) (0.90) (-1.35) (-1.57) (1.56)
IGDP -9.9391*** -2.5075*** -1.3977 -8.7606*** -3.4562*** -1.3758*
(-4.55) (-2.98) (-1.50) (5.26) (-2.92) (-1.91)
GOV -2.6668* -2.9615 -3.6100* -2.0598 1.6063 -2.1557
(-1.76) (-1.05) (-1.74) (-1.54) (0.57) (-1.26)
TRADE 2.4463** 5.5239** -0.0556 2.1568* 5.5237** -0.2913
(2.32) (2.12) (-0.03) (1.84) (2.14) (-0.15)
INF -0.1695 -0.3390* -0.3941 -0.1543 -0.3236 -0.2602
(-1.30) (-1.68) (-1.41) (-1.13) (-1.59) (-1.30)
EDUC 0.6339 6.6388*** 7.9210*** -0.0961 7.1604*** 6.7521***
(0.76) (2.85) (3.43) (-0.10) (3.42) (3.16)
Constant 82.7691*** -16.7438 -8.3748 75.0658*** -25.3281** -6.4102
(4.47) (-1.01) (-1.15) (5.60) (-2.22) (-0.91)
R2 0.37 0.40
Obs 512 512 497 512 512 497
Country 126 126 122 126 126 122
# Instruments 51 58 51 58
AR(1) -2.91*** -3.14*** -2.56** -2.98***
AR(2) -1.53 -0.77 -1.00 -0.89
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.481 0.498 0.327 0.610
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. All regressions consist of 3-year non-
overlapping growth spells. Models are estimated using fixed-effects (within) estimator (columns [1] and [4]),
Blundell-Bond’s GMM-system estimator with internal instruments only (columns [2] and [5]) and Blundell-
Bond’s GMM-system estimator with internal instruments and external instruments (legal origin and religion)
in columns [3] and [6]. The logarithm of (initial) household and enterprise credit to GDP is used in columns
[1-3] and the level of (initial) household and enterprise credit to GDP in columns [4-6]. All control variables
are in log and initial values for each period are used. Period dummies are added but not reported in
the table. AR(1/2) are the usual Arellano tests for autocorrelation and Hansen OID is the Hansen test
of over-identification. P-values are calculated form robust standard errors (clustered robust errors for FE
specification and robust errors using Windmeijer approach for correction in GMM-System regressions). *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
6.2 Robustness checks
I use the same battery of robustness checks as those employed in the previous section.
Results with additional control variables are reported in the Appendix (Tables A6). Co-
efficients associated with household credit are always negative. However, coefficients are
not statistically significant when institutional development and stock market development
are included as controls. One explanation is the reduction of the number of countries con-
sidered in both specifications. The effect of enterprise credit is more ambiguous insofar
as its coefficient is almost never different from zero.13
Secondly, I change econometric specifications by excluding outliers, employing Fi-
nancial Structure Database, using average values and considering two alternative period
13One exception is the model that considers the level of credit and includes volatility measure as a
control.
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definitions for panel data estimations (details are provided in Section 5.2.). When I use
the Financial Structure Database instead of the Credit Structure Database, household
credit is defined as a residual between total credit over GDP and enterprise credit (as
in Beck et al. (2012)). Overall credit is reported in the Financial Structure Database
and enterprise credit over GDP collected in the Credit Structure Database. Results from
panel data are displayed in the Appendix (Table A7). In all specifications, coefficients
associated with household credit enter negatively and are significantly different from zero
in almost all specifications (9 out of 12). Household credit is not statistically different
from zero when we compute household credit as a residual and when we consider average
value and log of credit. Turning to enterprise credit, coefficients are positive in almost all
specifications but firm credit is almost never statistically significant at the usual threshold.
An interesting question to study is whether developing countries (low- and middle
income countries) differ from developed economies in terms of relationship between credit
structure and economic growth. To do so, I first consider an interaction between household
credit (resp. firm credit) and a dummy with the value of one for high-income countries.
I then estimate the baseline model on the two sub-samples of countries. Results (for
panel data) are displayed in the Appendix (Table A8). The main message is the fact that
results do not seem driven by one group of countries. However, these results should be
treated with caution because some of the interest variables are not significant.
To sum up, robustness checks confirm our baseline results. Household credit is detri-
mental for economic growth, while we cannot give support for the positive effect of en-
terprise credit.
7 Conclusion
While many works have documented the positive effect of financial depth for growth,
recent contributions in the finance-growth nexus has shed light on the vanishing effect
of credit to growth in recent years. Indeed, since the 1990s most financially developed
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countries have not experienced higher growth spells. Several explanations, from financial
instability to substitution between banks and markets, have been proposed to explain
this shift. This paper focuses on a recent view that has emerged in the literature stating
that credit structure matters. For the past two decades, the structure of credit has
dramatically changed with an increase in the share of household credit to the detriment
of firm credit. Only a handful of papers (Beck et al., 2012; Sassi and Gasmi, 2014;
Bezemer et al., 2016) have investigated the implications of credit structure on growth,
and with ambiguous results. In addition, these works cover only a handful of countries
and differ in the samples considered (and methodology employed).
This paper attempts to distinguish the effects of household and enterprise credit on
economic growth using a large range of countries. To do so, I manually created a new
database covering 143 countries over the period 1995-2014 (126 countries are included
in the regressions). To compare findings with other papers, I replicate the methodology
employed in previous papers using both cross-country and panel data. In a first step, I
assess the effect of total credit on growth. In a second step, I focus on credit structure
by dividing total credit between firm and household credit.
Results support three significant conclusions. First, I confirm the vanishing effect es-
tablished by previous studies (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2015; Valickova
et al., 2015). Overall credit has not been related to growth in the past two decades and
this finding is very robust. Second, household credit tends to be negatively related with
growth. This finding is in line with previous studies documenting that household credit
has a weak link to growth (Beck et al., 2012) or a negative effect on growth (Sassi and
Gasmi, 2014; Bezemer et al., 2016). Third, I fail to provide support for a positive effect
of business credit, in line with Bezemer et al. (2016) but contradicting Beck et al. (2012)
and Sassi and Gasmi (2014).
From a policy perspective, this work raises doubts about policies that stimulate house-
hold credit to sustain growth. Household credit is not only not effective to spur growth
but it is even detrimental for it.
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From a research perspective, this work can be seen as a first step. Channels through
which household credit affect growth remain largely unknown. These channels include
impact of household loans on instability (Bu¨yu¨kkarabacak and Valev, 2010). However,
this channel is not sufficient to explain why household credit is detrimental for growth.
Even after controlling for banking crisis, the effect of household credit remains negative.
Other explanations, such as the impact of household credit on saving behaviors (Jappelli
and Pagano, 1994), should be considered. Data presented here offer us an opportunity
to investigate these potential explanations. In addition, future works should investigate
the vanishing effect, insofar as decomposition between firm and household credit cannot
explain this paradox. Put differently, the black box of the vanishing effect still remains
closed and deserves additional research.
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Appendix A Sample and variables
Table A1: List of countries
Country Income† Region Period Sample
Regression Evolution
Albania MIC (upper) Europe 2007-2014 X
Antigua and Barbuda HIC Latin America and Caribbean 2000-2014 X X
Argentina HIC Latin America and Caribbean 2003-2014 X
Armenia MIC (lower) Europe 1998-2014 X X
Aruba HIC Latin America and Caribbean 1998-2011 X
Australia HIC East Asia and Pacific 2000-2014 X X
Austria HIC Europe 1999-2014 X X
Azerbaijan MIC (upper) Central Asia 2005-2014 X
Bahamas HIC Latin America and Caribbean 1998-2014 X X
Bahrain HIC MENA 2007-2012 X
Barbados HIC Latin America and Caribbean 1995-2014 X X
Belarus MIC (upper) Europe 1999-2014 X X
Belgium HIC Europe 1999-2014 X X
Belize MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 1995-2014 X X
Benin LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
continued on next page
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Country Income† Region Period Sample
Regression Evolution
Bhutan MIC (lower) South Asia 2001-2014 X X
Bosnia Herzegovina MIC (upper) Europe 2000-2014 X
Botswana MIC (upper) Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2014 X X
Brazil MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2007-2014 X
Brunei Darussalam HIC East Asia and Pacific 2011-2014 X
Bulgaria MIC (upper) Europe 2004-2014 X
Burkina Faso LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
Cambodia LIC East Asia and Pacific 2004-2014 X
Cameroon MIC (lower) Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2010 X
Canada HIC North America 2007-2014 X
Central African Rep. LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2010 X
Chad LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2010 X
Chile HIC Latin America and Caribbean 1995-2014 X X
Colombia MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2002-2014 X X
Comores LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2014 X
Congo, Rep. MIC (lower) Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2010
Cote d’Ivoire MIC (lower) Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
Croatia HIC Europe 1995-2014 X
Cyprus HIC Europe 2005-2014 X
Czech Rep HIC Europe 2000-2014 X X
Denmark HIC Europe 2000-2014 X X
Djibouti MIC (lower) MENA 2006-2014 X
Dominica MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2000-2014 X X
Dominican Republic MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2006-2014 X
Egypt MIC (lower) MENA 2002-2014 X X
El Salvador MIC (lower) Latin America and Caribbean 2002-2014 X X
Equatorial Guinea HIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2010
Estonia HIC Europe 1997-2014 X X
Ethiopia LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X
Fiji MIC (upper) East Asia and Pacific 1995-2014 X X
Finland HIC Europe 1997-2014 X X
France HIC Europe 1995-2014 X X
Gabon MIC (upper) Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2010
Gambia LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2013 X X
Georgia MIC (lower) Europe 2002-2014 X X
Germany HIC Europe 1995-2014 X X
Greece HIC Europe 1998-2014 X X
Grenada MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2000-2014 X X
Guatemala MIC (lower) Latin America and Caribbean 2009-2014 X
Guinea LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2006-2008 X
Guinee-Bissau LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1999-2014 X X
Guyana MIC (lower) Latin America and Caribbean 2005-2014 X
Haiti LIC Latin America and Caribbean 2010-2013
Honduras MIC (lower) Latin America and Caribbean 2001-2014 X X
Hong-Kong HIC East Asia and Pacific 1997-2014 X X
Hungary HIC Europe 2000-2014 X X
Iceland HIC Europe 1995-2014 X X
India MIC (lower) South Asia 2005-2014 X
Indonesia MIC (lower) East Asia and Pacific 2006-2014 X
Ireland HIC Europe 2003-2014 X
continued on next page
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Country Income† Region Period Sample
Regression Evolution
Israel HIC MENA 1997-2014 X X
Italy HIC Europe 2005-2014 X
Jamaica MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 1995-2014 X X
Japan HIC East Asia and Pacific 1995-2014 X X
Kazakhstan MIC (upper) Central Asia 1996-2014 X X
Kenya MIC (lower) Sub-Saharan Africa 1997-2014 X X
Korea HIC East Asia and Pacific 2008-2014 X
Kosovo MIC (lower) Europe 2001-2014 X
Kuwait HIC MENA 2008-2014 X
Kyrgyc Republic MIC (lower) Central Asia 1996-2014 X X
Latvia HIC Europe 2003-2014 X
Lebanon MIC (upper) MENA 2010-2014 X
Lithuania HIC Europe 2004-2014 X
Luxembourg HIC Europe 1999-2014 X X
Macao HIC East Asia and Pacific 1995-2014 X X
Macedonia MIC (upper) Europe 1995-2014 X X
Madagascar LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1996-2013 X X
Malawi LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2002-2014 X X
Malaysia MIC (upper) East Asia and Pacific 2006-2014 X
Maldives MIC (upper) South Asia 1998-2008
Mali LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
Malta HIC Europe 2003-2013 X
Mauritius MIC (upper) Sub-Saharan Africa 2006-2014 X
Mexico MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 1995-2014 X X
Mongolia MIC (upper) East Asia and Pacific 2007-2014 X
Montenegro MIC (upper) Europe 2006-2014 X
Morocco MIC (lower) MENA 2006-2014 X
Mozambique LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2007-2014 X
Namibia MIC (upper) Sub-Saharan Africa 2005-2014 X
Nepal LIC South Asia 2003-2014 X
Netherlands, The HIC Europe 1998-2014 X X
New Zeland HIC East Asia and Pacific 2004-2014 X
Nicaragua MIC (lower) Latin America and Caribbean 1995-2014 X X
Niger LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
Oman HIC MENA 2000-2014 X X
Pakistan MIC (lower) South Asia 1999-2014 X X
Panama MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2002-2014 X X
Papua New Guinea MIC (lower) East Asia and Pacific 2012-2014
Peru MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2002-2014 X X
Philippines MIC (lower) East Asia and Pacific 2008-2014 X
Poland HIC Europe 1996-2014 X X
Portugal HIC Europe 1996-2014 X X
Puerto Rico HIC Latin America and Caribbean 2004-2014
Romania MIC (upper) Europe 2001-2014 X X
Russia HIC Europe 2001-2014 X X
Saudi Arabia HIC MENA 2008-2014 X
Senegal LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
Serbia MIC (upper) Europe 1999-2014 X X
Singapore HIC East Asia and Pacific 2004-2014
Slovak, Rep. HIC Europe 2003-2014 X
continued on next page
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Country Income† Region Period Sample
Regression Evolution
Slovenia HIC Europe 1995-2014 X X
Solomon Islands MIC (lower) East Asia and Pacific 1995-2014 X
South Africa MIC (upper) Sub-Saharan Africa 2008-2013 X
Spain HIC Europe 1999-2014 X X
Sri Lanka MIC (lower) South Asia 2010-2014 X
St. Kitts and Nevis HIC Latin America and Caribbean 2000-2014 X X
St. Lucia MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2000-2014 X X
St. Vincent and Grenadines MIC (upper) Latin America and Caribbean 2000-2014 X X
Swaziland MIC (lower) Sub-Saharan Africa 2005-2014 X
Sweden HIC Europe 1996-2014 X X
Switzerland HIC Europe 1995-2014 X X
Tajikistan MIC (lower) Central Asia 2005-2014 X
Thailand MIC (upper) East Asia and Pacific 1995-2014 X X
Timor Leste MIC (lower) East Asia and Pacific 2006-2014 X
Togo LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X X
Tonga MIC (upper) East Asia and Pacific 2010-2014 X
Trinidad and Tobago HIC Latin America and Caribbean 1996-2014 X X
Tunisia MIC (upper) MENA 2002-2014 X X
Turkey MIC (upper) Europe 1995-2014 X X
Uganda LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2010-2014 X
Ukraine MIC (lower) Europe 2002-2014 X X
United Arab Emirates HIC MENA 2000-2014 X
United Kingdom HIC Europe 1997-2014 X X
United States of America HIC North America 1995-2014 X X
Uruguay HIC Latin America and Caribbean 2005-2014 X
Vanuatu MIC (lower) East Asia and Pacific 2002-2014 X X
Zambia MIC (lower) Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2014 X
Zimbabwe LIC Sub-Saharan Africa 2009-2014
† HIC: High-income countries; LIC: Low-income countries; MIC: Middle-income coun-
tries
Table A2: Definition of variables
Variable Definition Source
Growth Annual growth of GDP per capita WDI
TC Total credit to GDP (sum of household and enterprise credit) Credit Structure Database
HC Household credit to GDP Credit Structure Database
EC Enterprise credit to GDP Credit Structure Database
IGDP Initial GDP per capita (constant 200 US$) WDI
GOV Government final expenditure over GDP WDI
TRADE Total amount of exports plus imports over GDP WDI
EDUC Share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary schools WDI
INF Annual growth of consumer price index WDI
VOLATILITY SD of annual growth WDI (author’s computation)
INSTITUTION ICRG index of quality of Government ICRG
CRISIS Banking crisis dummy Laeven and Valencia (2013)
STOCK MARKET Total capitalization over GDP Global Financial Development
PC Private credit over GDP Beck et al. (2010)
Legal origin Dummies origin for each country’s legal system La Porta et al. (1999)
Religion Share of catholic, protestant and muslim population in total population La Porta et al. (1999)
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Table A4: Total credit and growth, robustness checks (specification)
Log of total credit
Outliers Fin Str. One-year Five-year Average
Growth FD Data Obs. Obs. (lagged)
TC 0.0532 -1.2121 -1.1179 -0.1471 -0.6670 -1.2754*
(0.08) (-1.06) (-0.79) (-0.14) (-1.50) (-1.92)
Control Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Obs 457 451 439 1,196 218 330
Country 120 119 117 122 113 113
# instruments 51 51 51 111 28 46
AR(1) -2.59*** -2.99*** -3.14*** -1.56 -0.60 -3.23***
AR(2) -1.60 -0.38 0.13 -1.06 . 0.61
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.316 0.197 0.286 0.390 0.499 0.135
Level of total credit
Outliers Fin Str. One-year Five-year Average
Growth FD Data Obs. Obs. (lagged)
TC -0.0112 -0.0239 -0.0087 -0.0144 -0.0148 -0.0170*
(-0.84) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-1.36) (-1.27) (-1.66)
Control Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Obs 457 451 439 1,196 218 325
Country 120 119 117 122 113 113
# instruments 51 51 51 111 26 45
AR(1) -2.67*** -2.96*** -3.11*** -1.63 -0.89 -2.84***
AR(2) -1.30 -0.21 -0.08 -1.19 . -0.06
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.208 0.168 0.225 0.464 0.290 0.214
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. All regressions consist of 3-year
non-overlapping growth spells and are estimated using Blundell-Bond’s GMM-system estimator
with internal and external instruments (legal origin and religion). The logarithm of (initial) total
credit to GDP is used (columns log) and the level of (initial) total credit to GDP (columns level).
The list of control variables included the initial level of GDP, the government final consumption
over GDP, the trade openness (imports plus exports divided by GDP), the inflation rate, and the
level of education (secondary school enrolment). Period dummies are added but not reported in
the table. All control variables are in log and initial values for each period are used. AR(1/2)
are the usual Arellano tests for autocorrelation and Hansen OID is the Hansen test of over-
identification. P-values are calculated form robust (Windmeijer) standard errors. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A5: Total credit and growth, robustness checks (non-linearities)
All countries Sub-sample
HIC=1 HIC=0
[1] [2] [3] [4]
TC -0.0217 -0.0145 -0.0082 0.0018
(-0.85) (-0.70) (-0.67) (0.05)
TC2 0.00001
(0.24)
TC*HIC 0.0114
(0.19)
HIC -4.4898
(-0.65)
Control Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Obs 497 497 230 267
Country 122 122 50 72
# Instr 58 64 51 49
AR(1) -3.06*** -2.93*** -2.03** -1.74*
AR(2) 0.09 -0.34 -1.64 -0.55
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.473 0.358 0.362 0.512
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. All
regressions consist of 3-year non-overlapping growth spells and are
estimated using Blundell-Bond’s GMM-system estimator with inter-
nal and external instruments (legal origin and religion). The list of
control variables included the initial level of GDP, the government
final consumption over GDP, the trade openness (imports plus ex-
ports divided by GDP), the inflation rate, and the level of education
(secondary school enrolment). Period dummies are added but not re-
ported in the table. All control variables are in log and initial values
for each period are used. Initial value of total credit is employed.
HIC is a dummy for high-income countries. OLS estimates are used.
AR(1/2) are the usual Arellano tests for autocorrelation and Hansen
OID is the Hansen test of over-identification. P-values are calculated
form robust (Windmeijer) standard errors. *, **, *** indicate signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A7: Credit structure and growth, robustness checks (specification)
Log of total credit
Outliers Fin Str. One-year Five-year Average
Growth FD Data Obs. Obs. (lagged)
HC -1.3916*** -1.4117** -1.1955 -2.4636** -1.0245* -1.2428
(-3.05) (-2.05) (-1.63) (-2.29) (-1.77) (-1.36)
EC 1.3487** 0.4567 0.5466 1.4187 0.4376 0.4116
(2.31) (0.40) (0.43) (1.32) (0.54) (0.36)
Control Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Obs 457 451 439 1,195 217 370
Country 120 119 117 122 112 116
# instruments 58 58 58 128 32 52
AR(1) -2.73*** -2.71*** -2.76*** -1.42 -0.70 -2.12**
AR(2) -1.47 -1.39 -0.67 -1.88* . 1.14
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.373 0.247 0.174 0.701 0.464 0.45
Level of total credit
Outliers Fin Str. One-year Five-year Average
Growth FD Data Obs. Obs. (lagged)
HC -0.0690** -0.0801* -0.0120 -0.0975*** -0.0493** -0.0606**
(-2.16) (-1.66) (-1.11) (-2.71) (-2.16) (-2.20)
EC .0284 0.0163 -0.0030 0.0292 0.0071 0.0032
(1.30) (0.55) (-0.16) (1.21) (0.40) (0.14)
Control Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Obs 457 451 479 1,196 218 364
Country 120 119 122 122 113 117
# instruments 58 58 58 128 32 51
AR(1) -2.48** -2.46** -3.14*** -2.23** -1.03 -2.58***
AR(2) -1.40 -1.71 -0.28 -2.21** . 0.21
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.289 0.329 0.296 0.680 0.457 0.271
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. All regressions consist of 3-year
non-overlapping growth spells and are estimated using Blundell-Bond’s GMM-system estimator with
internal and external instruments (legal origin and religion). The logarithm of (initial) household
and enterprise credit to GDP is used (columns log) and the level of (initial) household and enterprise
credit to GDP (columns level). The list of control variables included the initial level of GDP, the
government final consumption over GDP, the trade openness (imports plus exports divided by GDP),
the inflation rate, and the level of education (secondary school enrolment). Period dummies are added
but not reported in the table. All control variables are in log and initial values for each period are
used. AR(1/2) are the usual Arellano tests for autocorrelation and Hansen OID is the Hansen test
of over-identification. P-values are calculated form robust (Windmeijer) standard errors. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A8: Credit structure and growth, robustness checks (non-linearities)
All countries Sub-sample
HIC=1 HIC=0
Log Levels Log Levels Log Levels
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
HC -2.4272* -0.0532 -1.3043 -0.0274 -0.0680 -0.1609
(-1.89) (-1.29) (-1.55) (-1.04) (-0.06) (-0.95)
EC 0.9493 0.0081 0.3355 -0.0007 0.4537 0.0607
(0.70) (0.32) (0.29) (-0.03) (0.33) (0.72)
HC*HIC 1.4533 -0.0904
(0.98) (-0.79)
EC*HIC 0.4136 0.0638
(0.23) (0.85)
HIC -6.3935 -2.6009
(-1.52) (-0.54)
Control Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Obs 497 497 230 230 267 267
Country 122 122 50 50 72 72
# instruments 78 78 58 58 56 56
AR(1) -2.77*** -2.52** -2.09** -2.04** -1.72* -1.86*
AR(2) -1.06 -0.85 -1.34 -1.24 0.39 -0.06
Hansen OID (p-value) 0.398 0.635 0.618 0.734 0.428 0.477
Dependent variables are the average real per capita GDP growth. All regressions consist of
3-year non-overlapping growth spells and are estimated using Blundell-Bond’s GMM-system
estimator with internal and external instruments (legal origin and religion). The list of control
variables included the initial level of GDP, the government final consumption over GDP, the
trade openness (imports plus exports divided by GDP), the inflation rate, and the level of
education (secondary school enrolment). Period dummies are added but not reported in the
table. All control variables are in log and initial values for each period are used. Initial value
of total credit is employed. HIC is a dummy for high-income countries. OLS estimates are
used. AR(1/2) are the usual Arellano tests for autocorrelation and Hansen OID is the Hansen
test of over-identification. P-values are calculated form robust (Windmeijer) standard errors.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Appendix C Additional figures
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